प्रागनुभविक प्रत्ययवाद

प्रागनुभविक प्रत्ययवाद (transcendental idealism) एक दार्शनिक प्रणाली है ^[1] जिसकी स्थापना 18वीं शताब्दी में जर्मन दार्शनिक इमैनुएल कांट ने की थी। कांट का ज्ञानमीमांसक कार्यक्रम ^[2] उनके शुद्ध तर्कबुद्धि की समालोचना (Critique of pure reason) (1781) में पाया जाता है। Transcendental अर्थात् इंद्रियातीत (एक शब्द जो विशेष स्पष्टीकरण का हकदार है ^[3] ) से कांट का अर्थ है कि ज्ञान के प्रति उनका दार्शनिक दृष्टिकोण केवल संवेदी साक्ष्य के विचार से परे है और उस संवेदी साक्ष्य को संसाधित करने के मन के सहज जन्मजात तरीकों की समझ की आवश्यकता होती है। ^[4]

शुद्ध तर्कबुद्धि की समालोचना के "संवेदनालंब-समीक्षा (Transcendental Aesthetic)" खंड में, कांट ने रेखांकित किया है कि कैसे दिक् और समय मानवीय अंतर्ज्ञान के शुद्ध रूप हैं जो हमारी अपनी संवेदना क्षमता द्वारा योगदान करते हैं। अंतरिक्ष और समय का हमसे "बाहर" कोई अस्तित्व नहीं है, बल्कि वे हमारी संवेदनशीलता के "व्यक्तिपरक" रूप हैं और इसलिए आवश्यक प्रागनुभविक (a priori) शर्तें हैं जिनके तहत हम अपने अनुभव में जिन वस्तुओं का सामना करते हैं वे हमें बिल्कुल भी दिखाई दे सकती हैं। कांट समय और स्थान को "अनुभवजन्यतः वास्तविक" लेकिन "इंद्रियातीत रूप से आदर्श" बताते हैं।^{[उद्धरण चाहिए]}

कांट का तर्क है कि सचेत विषय अनुभव की वस्तुओं को वैसे नहीं संज्ञानता जैसे वे स्वयं में हैं, बल्कि केवल उसी तरह से संज्ञानता है जिस तरह से वे हमारी संवेदनशीलता की स्थितियों के तहत हमें दिखाई देते हैं । इस प्रकार कांट का सिद्धांत हमारी संज्ञान के दायरे को हमारी संवेदनशीलता को दिए गए बाह्याकृति तक सीमित कर देता है और इस बात से इनकार करता है कि हम चीजों का संज्ञान उसी तरह से कर सकते हैं जैसे वे अपने आप में हैं, यानी चीजें जैसी वे स्वतंत्र रूप से हैं जो उस बात पर निर्भर नहीं करती हैं कि हम उन्हें अपनी संज्ञानात्मक क्षमताओं के माध्यम से कैसे अनुभव करते हैं।

↑ Kant, Immanuel (1996) [First edition originally published in 1781; second edition originally published in 1787]. "Introduction by Patricia Kitcher, 3. Transcendental Aesthetic: The Science of Sensory Perception, B. Space, Time, and Mathematics". Critique of Pure Reason. Pluhar, Werner S. द्वारा अनूदित (Unified Edition with all variants from the 1781 and 1787 editions संस्करण). Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. पृ॰ xxxvi. आई॰ऍस॰बी॰ऍन॰ 0-87220-257-7. This is one of the first conclusions of "transcendental idealism," Kant's own name for his philosophical system, and we need to pause to consider it carefully to avoid some standard misunderstandings.
↑ Kant, Immanuel (1996) [First edition originally published in 1781; second edition originally published in 1787]. "Introduction by Patricia Kitcher, 2. Prefaces and Introduction: Kant's Central Problem". Critique of Pure Reason. Pluhar, Werner S. द्वारा अनूदित (Unified Edition with all variants from the 1781 and 1787 editions संस्करण). Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. पृ॰ l. आई॰ऍस॰बी॰ऍन॰ 0-87220-257-7. Kant prefaces the ‘’Critique’’ with a lament about the sad state of metaphysics. But his program for reform is thoroughly epistemological. It is only by working our way to a better understanding of the sources and limits of human knowledge that we will be able to figure out what metaphysical questions can fruitfully be asked.
↑ Kant, Immanuel (1996) [First edition originally published in 1781; second edition originally published in 1787]. "Introduction by Patricia Kitcher, 2. Prefaces and Introduction: Kant's Central Problem". Critique of Pure Reason. Pluhar, Werner S. द्वारा अनूदित (Unified Edition with all variants from the 1781 and 1787 editions संस्करण). Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. पृ॰ l. आई॰ऍस॰बी॰ऍन॰ 0-87220-257-7. Because of the unusual nature of his enterprise, Kant gave it a special name: “transcendental” philosophy. The goal of transcendental philosophy is to investigate the necessary conditions for knowledge with a view to showing that some of those necessary conditions are a priori, universal and necessary features of our knowledge, that derive from the mind’s own ways of dealing with the data of the senses. The term “transcendental” has often been a source of confusion, because it includes three not obviously related ideas: (1) the idea that some conditions are necessary for knowledge and (2) the idea that some claims are a priori, in stating necessary and universal features of the world, and (3) the idea that some features of our knowledge are a priori, in the sense that they do not derive from sensory evidence, but from our minds’ ways of dealing with sensory evidence. What is distinctive about Kant’s philosophy is his belief that some of the necessary conditions for knowledge are also a priori, in all four sense of that term: they are universal, necessary, cannot be established by sensory experience, and reflect the mind’s ways of dealing with sensory experience; the term “transcendental” constantly draws attention to that complex doctrine.
↑ Durant, Will (1933). "VI. Immanuel Kant and German Idealism, III. The Critique of Pure Reason, 1. Transcendental Esthetic". The Story of Philosophy. New York: Simon & Schuster (प्रकाशित 1953). पृ॰ 267. The effort to answer this question, to study the inherent structure of the mind, or the innate laws of thought, is what Kant calls “transcendental philosophy,” because it is a problem transcending sense experience. “I call knowledge transcendental which is occupied not so much with objects, as with ‘’á priori’’ concepts of objects.”—with our modes of correlating our experience into knowledge.

[Kitcher_Intro-1] Kant, Immanuel (1996) [First edition originally published in 1781; second edition originally published in 1787]. "Introduction by Patricia Kitcher, 3. Transcendental Aesthetic: The Science of Sensory Perception, B. Space, Time, and Mathematics". Critique of Pure Reason. Pluhar, Werner S. द्वारा अनूदित (Unified Edition with all variants from the 1781 and 1787 editions संस्करण). Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. पृ॰ xxxvi. आई॰ऍस॰बी॰ऍन॰ 0-87220-257-7. This is one of the first conclusions of "transcendental idealism," Kant's own name for his philosophical system, and we need to pause to consider it carefully to avoid some standard misunderstandings.

[2] Kant, Immanuel (1996) [First edition originally published in 1781; second edition originally published in 1787]. "Introduction by Patricia Kitcher, 2. Prefaces and Introduction: Kant's Central Problem". Critique of Pure Reason. Pluhar, Werner S. द्वारा अनूदित (Unified Edition with all variants from the 1781 and 1787 editions संस्करण). Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. पृ॰ l. आई॰ऍस॰बी॰ऍन॰ 0-87220-257-7. Kant prefaces the ‘’Critique’’ with a lament about the sad state of metaphysics. But his program for reform is thoroughly epistemological. It is only by working our way to a better understanding of the sources and limits of human knowledge that we will be able to figure out what metaphysical questions can fruitfully be asked.

[3] Kant, Immanuel (1996) [First edition originally published in 1781; second edition originally published in 1787]. "Introduction by Patricia Kitcher, 2. Prefaces and Introduction: Kant's Central Problem". Critique of Pure Reason. Pluhar, Werner S. द्वारा अनूदित (Unified Edition with all variants from the 1781 and 1787 editions संस्करण). Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. पृ॰ l. आई॰ऍस॰बी॰ऍन॰ 0-87220-257-7. Because of the unusual nature of his enterprise, Kant gave it a special name: “transcendental” philosophy. The goal of transcendental philosophy is to investigate the necessary conditions for knowledge with a view to showing that some of those necessary conditions are a priori, universal and necessary features of our knowledge, that derive from the mind’s own ways of dealing with the data of the senses. The term “transcendental” has often been a source of confusion, because it includes three not obviously related ideas: (1) the idea that some conditions are necessary for knowledge and (2) the idea that some claims are a priori, in stating necessary and universal features of the world, and (3) the idea that some features of our knowledge are a priori, in the sense that they do not derive from sensory evidence, but from our minds’ ways of dealing with sensory evidence. What is distinctive about Kant’s philosophy is his belief that some of the necessary conditions for knowledge are also a priori, in all four sense of that term: they are universal, necessary, cannot be established by sensory experience, and reflect the mind’s ways of dealing with sensory experience; the term “transcendental” constantly draws attention to that complex doctrine.

[Durant-4] Durant, Will (1933). "VI. Immanuel Kant and German Idealism, III. The Critique of Pure Reason, 1. Transcendental Esthetic". The Story of Philosophy. New York: Simon & Schuster (प्रकाशित 1953). पृ॰ 267. The effort to answer this question, to study the inherent structure of the mind, or the innate laws of thought, is what Kant calls “transcendental philosophy,” because it is a problem transcending sense experience. “I call knowledge transcendental which is occupied not so much with objects, as with ‘’á priori’’ concepts of objects.”—with our modes of correlating our experience into knowledge.

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